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Hash comparisons to provide warnings of phishing attacks
ABSTRACT
This disclosure describes techniques to warn users when a password for a particular
online domain is being submitted by a user device to a domain different than the one for which it
was originally registered. The warning alerts the user of possible phishing attacks. Cryptographic
hashes of user passwords along with corresponding domains are stored. When a user attempts to
send data to a website, e.g., via form submission, hashes of the data are calculated and compared
with the stored hashes of password. In the case of a match, a warning is presented to the user.
The techniques can be implemented as a feature of a web browser, a browser plugin, as
standalone software, as part of an operating system, etc.
KEYWORDS
● phishing
● password manager
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● security
BACKGROUND
Phishing is a type of online attack where a hacker poses as a trustworthy entity, such as a
bank, a social networking site, etc., in an attempt to obtain sensitive information such as
usernames, passwords, financial information, etc. from a user. Phishing attacks also include
attackers pretending to be someone else, e.g., by setting up fake websites that imitate websites
that users access commonly, e.g., social networking, e-mail websites, bank websites, ecommerce
websites, etc. Users may not realize when accessing such fake websites that they are providing
sensitive information to hackers. Once user information is obtained, hackers can use such
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information to represent themselves as the user to obtain more information or to engage in
harmful activities such as identity theft, bank fraud, etc.
Software, including web browsers, plugins for web browsers, password management
tools, etc. can store usernames and/or user passwords, when permitted by a user. Users find such
features convenient, e.g., since it saves users the effort to remember such information. Some
tools also include features to automatically generate secure passwords for the user. A user can
use such software for automatic generation and entry of passwords, e.g., for various websites.
While such software offers ease of use, it does not mitigate phishing attack that tricks users into
revealing information.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques that automatically detect form submissions that
include user password information to unverified or fake websites. When such submissions are
detected, the user is warned of a potential phishing attack and asked to provide confirmation to
submit the form data.
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Fig. 1: Generating warning of potential phishing attack
Fig. 1 illustrates the technique to prevent phishing attacks using password management
features. The techniques can be implemented as a feature of a web browser, a browser plugin, as
standalone software, as part of an operating system, etc. The techniques are implemented upon
specific user permissions, e.g., to store user data such as domain names, password hashes, etc. If
the user does not provide permission, the techniques are not implemented.
With user permission, it is detected when a user enters a password, e.g., for a website
(102). When the user provides consent, a cryptographic hash of the password is stored along with
the identity of the web domain to which the password is submitted (104). The cryptographic hash
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is a one-way hash from which the original password cannot be extracted. This is implemented for
every password that the user enters. For example, the password entry is recognized when the user
signs up at a website, logs in to a website, etc.
At each future instance when a user attempts to submit information to a website, e.g., via
form submission, such submission is detected (106) if user has provided consent. The values of
different fields of the form are hashed using the same techniques used to generate the
cryptographic hash of the password (108). The generated hashes of the form fields are compared
with the stored password hashes (110).
If none of the generated hashes match a stored password hash, it is determined that no
password data is being sent and thus, form submission is completed (116). If one or more of the
generated hashes match a particular stored password hash, it is determined whether the domain
for the form submission matches a stored domain identity associated with the particular stored
password hash (112). When the domain identities match, it is determined that the password
information is being sent to the domain that is associated with the password, and therefore, form
submission is continued.
If the domain identities do not match, it is determined that the password information is
being sent to a domain that is not associated with the stored password, which is indicative of a
potential phishing attack. In this instance, a warning is provided to the user indicating that the
website for form submissions does not match that associated with the password (114). The user
can then abort the form submission, thus preventing user information from being sent to
potentially malicious website. Form submission is continued if the user provides confirmation,
e.g., when the same password is used for different domains. The techniques of this disclosure do
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not store passwords directly, and are thus suitable for users who do not permit storage of
passwords.
Further, the stored hash used for matching can be only a portion of the cryptographic
hash of the password. This provides a benefit in that the user password is not recoverable from
the stored partial hash, e.g., in case of a dictionary attack. However, this can result in multiple
passwords matching to the same stored hash and cause false positives during detection; however,
the cost is relatively small, since the user can dismiss warnings generated due to such a match.
Further, a password obtained by a dictionary attack on the partial hash will not let an attacker
successfully log in as a user, and the user can rely on features by which most online services
block or suspend user accounts due to too many failed login attempts.
The techniques described herein are implemented upon specific user permission. The
techniques can be implemented in such a manner that a user can skip checking of form
submissions for certain web pages, domains, types of domains, etc. Further, the user can
designate certain domains for which matching of password hashes is not performed. The
techniques can be used in combination with other security mechanisms to enhance security.
Password hashes and domain identities are stored only upon specific user permission, and only
as permitted by the user. The use of stored hashes is restricted to determine potential attacks and
the stored hashes are not used otherwise.
In situations in which certain implementations discussed herein may collect or use
personal information about users (e.g., user data, information about a user’s social network,
user's location and time at the location, user's biometric information, user's activities and
demographic information), users are provided with one or more opportunities to control whether
information is collected, whether the personal information is stored, whether the personal
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information is used, and how the information is collected about the user, stored and used. That
is, the systems and methods discussed herein collect, store and/or use user personal information
specifically upon receiving explicit authorization from the relevant users to do so. For example,
a user is provided with control over whether programs or features collect user information about
that particular user or other users relevant to the program or feature. Each user for which
personal information is to be collected is presented with one or more options to allow control
over the information collection relevant to that user, to provide permission or authorization as to
whether the information is collected and as to which portions of the information are to be
collected. For example, users can be provided with one or more such control options over a
communication network. In addition, certain data may be treated in one or more ways before it
is stored or used so that personally identifiable information is removed. As one example, a
user’s identity may be treated so that no personally identifiable information can be determined.
As another example, a user’s geographic location may be generalized to a larger region so that
the user's particular location cannot be determined.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to warn users when password for a particular online
domain is being submitted by a user device to a different domain. The warning alerts the user of
possible phishing attacks. A cryptographic hash of user passwords along with corresponding
domains are stored. When a user attempts to send data to a website, e.g., via form submission,
hashes of the data are calculated and compared with the stored hashes of password. In the case of
a match, a warning is presented to the user.
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